Return to the case of Jan, the hyperbolic discounter from the previous question. Suppose she can sign a contract that requires her to give up money equivalent to a loss of X utils if she does not undertake the action. Assume she does not behave consistent with her plans without this contract. How high would the contractual value of X have to be to prevent her inconsistency?
a. C – B/2.
b. B.
c. C.
d. B + C.
a
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From the table below, choose the optimum option using marginal analysis
Option Total Cost ($) 1 150 2 100 3 80 4 70 5 90 6 120 What will be an ideal response?
The optimal amount of pollution is not zero because
A) it has been found that pollution in moderate amounts actually has positive benefits. B) there are no benefits to anyone from having zero pollution. C) zero pollution would be too costly. D) we don't have the political structure that could accomplish the goal.
The supply of loanable funds comes, in part, from
a. consumer saving b. business investment c. the federal government d. current consumption e. future consumption
According to the graph shown, if the government decides to increase its spending, it is most likely at point:
A. C
B. B
C. D
D. It's impossible to tell without more information.