Why does cooperative behavior break down in games with finite endpoints?
A) Each player has an incentive to deviate from a cooperative strategy during the last period.
B) A Nash equilibrium in pure strategies is not possible in finite repeated games.
C) Finite games have the same outcomes as one-period games, and cooperation is not possible in one-period games.
D) A Nash equilibrium is only possible in mixed strategies in finite repeated games, but all of the probabilities assigned to particular strategies approach zero as the number of finite game periods becomes large. Thus, we cannot evaluate the expected payoffs in these games.
A
You might also like to view...
During an economic downturn, increased spending on infrastructure repairs is:
A. more costly because the resources needed to complete those projects aren't available. B. a bad idea because there's no need for better infrastructure during an economic downturn. C. less costly because the resources needed to complete those projects would otherwise sit idle. D. a good idea because it will slow the pace of economic recovery.
How can a bond investor hedge against a possible bear market in bonds?
A) sell futures contracts on Treasury notes B) buy futures contracts on Treasury notes C) going long in the spot market D) going short in the spot market
Suppose that there are two firms, each generating three tons of SO2. Suppose also that the government has set a target abatement level of two tons. Under a policy of uniform abatement with permits, the firm with the lower marginal abatement cost:
A. will abate exactly the same amount of SO2 as the firm with the higher marginal abatement cost. B. will abate less SO2 than the firm with the higher marginal abatement cost. C. will abate more SO2 than the firm with the higher marginal abatement cost. D. will sell its pollution permit to the firm with the higher marginal abatement cost.
Globally, from 1996-2013 the highest average growth rate per year occurred on the continent of Africa.
Answer the following statement true (T) or false (F)