If a pooling equilibrium is played in a signaling game, beliefs about the sender type can take on any form along the branch of the game tree that is not played in equilibrium, but on the branch that is played, beliefs are identical to the probability distribution with which "nature" assigned types to the sender.
Answer the following statement true (T) or false (F)
True
Rationale: If something does not happen in equilibrium, there is not (easy) natural way of thinking about beliefs in the even that the thing that cannot happen in equilibrium did happen. But, in a pooling equilibrium, all sender types play the same action, which means that beliefs about sender types have to be consistent with how nature assigned types when we are on the equilibrium path.
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