Why is the Supreme Court case of Fare v. Michael C. (1979) so significant for our nation's juvenile probation officers?

Question

What will be an ideal response?

Answer 1

The only case ever to be decided by the U.S. Supreme Court on juvenile probation supervision is Fare v. Michael C. (1985). This important California case helps define the relationship between a probation officer and a probationer during probation supervision. Michael C., a juvenile, was taken into police custody because he was suspected of having committed a murder. He was advised of his Miranda v. Arizona (1966) rights. When asked if he wanted to waive his right to have an attorney present during questioning, he responded by asking for his probation officer. He was informed by the police that the probation officer would be contacted later but that he could talk to the police if he wanted. Michael C. agreed to talk and during questioning made statements and drew sketches that incriminated himself. When charged with murder in juvenile court, Michael C. moved to suppress the incriminating evidence, alleging it was obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. He said that his request to see his probation officer was, in effect, equivalent to asking for a lawyer. However, the evidence was admitted at trial, and Michael C. was convicted.
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the request by a juvenile probationer during police questioning to see his or her probation officer, after having received the Miranda warnings, is not equivalent to asking for a lawyer and is not considered an assertion of the right to remain silent. Evidence voluntarily given by the juvenile probationer after asking to see his probation officer is therefore admissible in court in a subsequent criminal trial. The Supreme Court laid out two principles that help define the supervisory role of a juvenile probation officer. First, the Court stated that confidentiality of communication between the probation officer and a juvenile probationer does not exist like it does with the lawyer–client privilege. This means that information given by a probationer to the probation officer may be disclosed in court, unlike the information given to a lawyer by a client—which cannot be revealed to anyone unless the right to confidentiality is waived by both the client and the lawyer. Second, the Court emphasized that a probation officer's loyalty and obligation are to the state, despite any obligation owed to the probationer.