Consider this passage from Descartes: "Don't I know myself much more truly and certainly, and also much more distinctly and plainly, than I know the wax? For, if I base my judgment that the wax exists on the fact that I see it, my seeing it much more obviously implies that I exist. It's possible that what I see is not really wax, and it's even possible that I don't have eyes with which to
see--but it clearly is not possible that, when I see (or, what now amounts to the same thing, when I think I see), the 'I' which thinks is not a real thing." Descartes is here claiming
A) that the "I" is less distinctly known than the wax.
B) that it is not possible to doubt that the "I" is a real thing, but it is possible to doubt the wax is a real thing.
C) It is possible to doubt that the "I" is a real thing.
D) the wax is more distinctly known than the I.
B
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Syllogism 3D Given the following syllogism: Edward gets angry whenever customers complain. Thus, Edward must have been angry yesterday, because customers were complaining yesterday. For Syllogism 3D, the minor premise is:
A) All times Edward gets angry are times customers complain. B) All times customers complain are times identical to yesterday. C) All times identical to yesterday are times Edward gets angry. D) All times customers complain are times Edward gets angry. E) All times identical to yesterday are times customers complain.
Truth is a total defense against allegations of defamation.
a. true b. false
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