What incentive might keep a state from breaking a promise?
a. In single play, keeping a promise can lead to the best outcome for the player.
b. In single play, a broken promise can badly damage a state's reputation.
c. In iterated play, a broken promise can badly damage a state's reputation.
d. In iterated play, keeping a promise can lead to the best outcome for the player.
c
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How does Ratner describe the U.S. position toward the enforcement of international norms through such organizations as the UN and the WTO?
a. It opposes all enforcement of international norms for fear that said norms will one day be used against it. b. It encourages enforcement only as long as it serves U.S. interests but opposes enforcement of those same norms against itself. c. Even though the United States is the world's sole superpower, it cannot defy international norms without the fear of sanctions. d. It pays more dues than other member states in these organizations in hopes of influencing policy outcomes in the enforcement of international norms. e. It opposes the existence of an organization that espouses international norms for fear that said organization, such as the United Nations, will rival U.S. power.
If the United Nations sends troops into Somalia to help ensure basic humanitarian needs are met and warring factions fulfill a cease-fire agreement, this is an example of:
A) ?Disarmament B) ?A security community C) ?Collective security D) ?Peacekeeping E) ?Compellence
Which of the following is/are often at odds with environmental protection efforts?
A. personal economics B. human health C. national economics D. energy production E. All of these answers are correct.
If the constitution of a country vests all governmental power in the central government, then it is most likely to follow a(n) ________ system of governance
A. unitary B. federal C. technocratic D. anarchic E. republican