If the marginal propensity to consume is 0.85 and there are no imports or income taxes, the expenditure multiplier is equal to
A) 1 ÷ (1 - 0.85 ) = 1 ÷ 0.15 = 1.45.
B) 0.85 × the change in autonomous expenditure.
C) 0.85 ÷ 1 = 0.85.
D) 1 ÷ 0.85 = 1.176.
E) 1 - 0.85 = 0.15.
A
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Suppose Bill Gates deposits $20 million into his checking account at Wells Fargo Bank. If the required reserve ratio is 10 percent, what is the maximum change in money supply?
A) -$200 million B) -$180 million C) $2 million D) $180 million E) $200 million
A executive can either slack (effort e = 0) or work hard (e = 1) on behalf of shareholders. If she slacks, the firm earns a gross return of 1,000 for sure. If she works hard, there is an even chance of the gross return being 10,000 or 80,000 . Her overall utility equals her utility from wage income (of the form w1/2, where w is the wage) minus the disutility of work (simply d), or in other words
U = w1/2 – d. If she slacks, she experiences no disutility of work (d = 0) but if she works hard, the disutility of work is d = 50 . Assume that U = 0 in her next best available job. What is the optimal wage contract that shareholders would offer if they can observe the effort of the executive? a. A flat wage w = 0 and no requirement to work hard. b. A flat wage w = 50 and a requirement to work hard. c. A flat wage w = 2,500 and a requirement to work hard. d. A share of 50% of the profits and a requirement to work hard.
The assumption of rational self-interest does not rule out the possibility of concern for other individuals
a. True b. False
Which of the following is NOT a condition that helps enforce a cartel agreement?
A. nearly homogeneous products B. large variation in input prices C. easily observable prices D. a small number of firms