In the Stackelberg model, suppose the first-mover has MR = 15 - Q1, the second firm has reaction function Q2 = 15 - Q1/2, and production occurs at zero marginal cost
Why doesn't the first-mover announce that its production is Q1 = 30 in order to exclude the second firm from the market (i.e., Q2 = 0 in this case)? A) In this case, MR is negative and is less than MC, so the first-mover would be producing less than the optimal quantity.
B) In this case, MR is negative and is less than MC, so the first-mover would be producing too much output.
C) This is a possible outcome from the Stackelberg duopoly under these conditions.
D) We do not have enough information to determine if this is an optimal outcome for this case.
B
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Answer the following statement(s) true (T) or false (F)
1. The amount of output produced by two firms in a Cournot oligopoly setting is greater than that produced by a monopoly, but smaller than that which would be produced if the market were perfectly competitive. 2. According to the Bertrand model, price and output is higher under oligopoly than under competition. 3. A firm has monopoly power when it is the single seller of a good or service. 4. If a monopoly desires to raise its profits, it can simply raise the price it charges. 5. We know that the producer's surplus accruing to a simple monopoly firm must be greater than operating in a competitive market, else firms would not act as monopolists.
Which of the following best describes aggregate expenditure?
a. C + I + G + (X ? M) b. C + S + G + (X ? M) c. C + I + G + (X + M) d. C + I + T + (X ? M) e. C + I + T + (X + M)
When a tariff is imposed on the import of a good in a country, the quantity of the good that can be sold by domestic producers to foreign countries is limited
a. True b. False Indicate whether the statement is true or false
Setting performance goals based on historical data and past performance creates:
A. a ratchet effect. B. a compensating differential. C. opportunism. D. the horizon problem.