Suppose a player in a game has a dominant strategy, but they threaten to take another action. Can this threat be credible?
A) No, such threats are never credible to other rational players.
B) No, if the player has a dominant strategy, they must take this action.
C) Yes, if they can link the current game to another bargaining problem in which their joint strategy for the combined games is rational.
D) Yes, dominant strategies may not always yield the highest payoffs.
C
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In order to maximize profits in the short run, a price taker should always produce at the output level where marginal cost is equal to price.
Answer the following statement(s) true (T) or false (F)
The aggregate supply curve shows
A. how the cost of living is related to the sum of consumption, investment, and government spending. B. how demand for final products is related to the price level. C. how production in the economy is related to the price level. D. None of the choices are shown by the aggregate supply curve.
An increase in the expected price level shifts the short-run aggregate supply curve to the right
a. True b. False Indicate whether the statement is true or false
When there is a price ceiling there will be
A. a shortage. B. a surplus. C. either a shortage or a surplus. D. neither a shortage nor a surplus.