Was the initial search of Irving's luggage at the airport constitutional? Was the second search of the film and diskettes constitutional?

Question

. In 1983 Stefan Irving, a school pediatrician, was convicted of attempted sexual abuse of a sevenyear-old boy, imprisoned, and lost his license to practice medicine. In 1996 the federal government initiated a nationwide investigation of individuals suspected of traveling to Mexico for the purpose of engaging in sexual acts with children. In 1998 Irving traveled to Acapulco, Mexico to visit a guest house serving as a place where men from the United States could have sexual relations with Mexican boys. Upon returning to the United States from Mexico through the Dallas-Fort Worth Airport, Irving was stopped, searched and interviewed by United States Customs inspectors at the request of a Special Agent who was investigating Irving. The initial search of Irving's luggage in the "sterile area" of the Dallas-Fort Worth Airport revealed children's books and drawings apparently drawn by children, but nothing incriminating. Nonetheless, the Customs agents questioned Irving further. He admitted he was a convicted pedophile, but denied having visited the guest house, saying he had visited a friend. A second search of Irving's luggage, in a Customs office 40 yards from the initial inspection, revealed a disposable camera and two 3.5 inch computer diskettes, which the agents said they would need to examine. Irving denied having any child pornography on either the diskettes or the camera and refused to sign a Customs form consenting to their seizure. The film Irving was carrying turned out to have pictures taken at the guest house with boys. Images of child erotica were found on the diskettes. Several years later, the information obtained at the border search was used to get a warrant to search Irving's home for evidence of child pornography and violations of traveling outside the United States for the purpose of engaging in sexual acts with children under the age of 18.
What will be an ideal response?

Answer 1

Yes; Yes.

The initial search of Irving's luggage in the "sterile area" was a routine border search. An airport is considered the functional equivalent of a border and thus a search there may fit within the border search exception. Routine searches include those searches of outer clothing, luggage, a purse, wallet, pockets, or shoes. Routine border searches of a person's belongings are made reasonable by that person's decision to enter the country and do not substantially infringe on a traveler's privacy rights. The initial search was a routine border search and was constitutional. More invasive border searches, like strip searches, infringe on a traveler's privacy rights. They must be justified by reasonable suspicion. An invasive border search is determined by the level of privacy intrusion and not by the level of suspicion of a person entering the United States. It is not necessary to determine whether or not the film and diskette searches were routine or non-routine because they were supported by reasonable suspicion already known to the Customs agents: Irving was a convicted pedophile; he was the subject of criminal investigation; he had been to Mexico; he claimed that he visited an orphanage while in Mexico; and his luggage contained children's books and drawings that appeared to be drawn by children. These all constitute specific and articulable facts, and thus may serve as the basis of reasonable suspicion. the Customs agents had a reasonable basis for examining the diskettes and the undeveloped film. Irving raised the issue that his searches were pretexts because special agents were investigating him. Of the warrant exception contexts in which the Supreme Court has addressed the issue of pretextual searches, border searches seem most analogous to searches of vessels by Customs officials. And, in that context, the Court noted, "[w]e would see little logic in sanctioning such examinations of ordinary, unsuspect vessels but forbidding them in the case of suspected smugglers." United States v. VillamonteMarquez (1983). Similarly, in the case of searches at airports, it would make little sense to allow random searches of any incoming passenger, without reasonable suspicion, see United States v. Montoya de Hernandez (1985), but require reasonable suspicion for searches of passengers that are suspected of criminal activity. From this reason the validity of a border search does not depend on whether it is prompted by a criminal investigative motive.