Player 1 and Player 2 are playing a game in which Player 1 has the first move at A in the decision tree shown below. Once Player 1 has chosen either Up or Down, Player 2, who can see what Player 1 has chosen, must choose Up or Down at B or C. Both players know the payoffs at the end of each branch. 
If Player 2 could make a credible commitment to choose either Up or Down when his or her turn came, then what would Player 2 do?
A. Player 2 would commit to choosing Down.
B. Player 2 would commit to choosing Up.
C. Player 2 would not commit to choosing either strategy.
D. Player 2 would commit to mimicking Player 1's strategy.
Answer: A
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