If Happy Cleaners and Sparkle Cleaners are in a Cournot oligopoly, the Cournot equilibrium will ________.
A) occur at a point on Happy Cleaners' best-response curve, but not Sparkle Cleaners' best-response curve
B) provide an incentive for both firms to adjust their output
C) occur at the intersection of Happy Cleaners' and Sparkle Cleaners' best response curves
D) only occur if Happy Cleaners and Sparkle Cleaners form a cartel
C) occur at the intersection of Happy Cleaners' and Sparkle Cleaners' best response curves
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In the above figure, the market is at its equilibrium. Area B is equal to
A) consumer surplus. B) total revenue. C) marginal benefit. D) producer surplus. E) total surplus.
The effective rate of protection measures
A) the "true" ad valorem value of a tariff. B) the quota equivalent value of a tariff. C) the efficiency with which the tariff is collected at the customhouse. D) the protection given by the tariff to domestic value added. E) the difference between domestic and foreign prices of the import.
What are the outcomes of the following games, assuming the max-min criteria is used?
What will be an ideal response?
Suppose two Cournot duopolist firms operate at zero marginal cost. The market demand is p = a - bQ. Each firm will produce
A) a/b. B) a/2b. C) a/3b. D) a/4b.