Two games that differ only in the timing of moves—one simultaneous, the other sequential move—can sometimes have completely different subgame-perfect equilibria. Why?
a. The second mover to choose non-credible threats.
b. The first mover can choose an action that it would deviate from if its action were secret.
c. Subgame-perfect equilibrium cannot be applied to simultaneous games.
d. All of the above.
b
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A firm's cost of variable inputs per unit of output is known as
a. average total cost b. average fixed cost c. marginal cost d. total variable cost e. average variable cost
Since World War II, there have been ________ but ________ in the U.S. economy
a. no recessions; five depressions b. three depressions; no recessions c. recessions; no depressions d. depressions; no recessions
The rule of 70 states that
A) it takes an economy 70 years to double its real GDP. B) the number of years it takes an economy to double in size is 70 divided by the growth rate. C) the number of years it takes an economy to double in size is the growth rate times 70. D) the number of years it takes an economy to double in size is the growth rate divided by 70.
Answer the following statements true (T) or false (F)
1. In the median-voter model, the median voter refers to the voter who makes her choice at the midpoint of the voting period. 2. In the median-voter model, half the voters have stronger or more positive preferences than the median voter, while half of the voters have weaker or more negative preferences. 3. One prediction of the median-voter model is that during elections, candidates will tend to become "centrists". 4. One implication of the median-voter model as applied to a vote regarding how much government involvement to have in the economy is that most voters would find the resulting government involvement either too large or too small. 5. "Voter failure" is one cause of government failure.