The Decision for War, 1965First review Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's July 1, 1965, recommendation for direct American involvement in the Vietnam War:http://astro.temple.edu/~rimmerma/memorandum_from_secretary_of_def.htmNext, open the following link and read item 40, Paper by the Under Secretary of State (Ball), which details Undersecretary of State George Ball's objections to escalation (you do not need to read the attachment to this paper):http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v03/d40a) In McNamara's words, what objective was the U.S. seeking in South Vietnam?b) What three courses of action did McNamara argue were available to the United States? Which did he recommend? Why?c) According to the "CIA estimate" McNamara quoted in the conclusion of his

Question

memorandum, what two conditions did the U.S. have to establish before Hanoi would stop its effort to destroy the South Vietnamese government? How might Hanoi alter its strategy in South Vietnam were those conditions met?d) Does McNamara's memorandum suggest that he had confidence that American intervention would succeed? In his view, how might Hanoi counter American escalation?e) What was George Ball's estimation of the likelihood that American forces would succeed in defeating the National Liberation Front (NLF) guerrillas? What specific examples did he cite to support his position?f) What did Ball see as the principal question confronting the Johnson Administration in its deliberations over Vietnam? What did he contend would happen were the U.S. to intervene in South Vietnam?g) What course of action did Ball recommend?h) If you were Lyndon Johnson, whose advice-Ball's or McNamara's-would you have followed? Why?

What will be an ideal response?

Answer 1