Suppose duopolists face the market inverse demand curve P = 100 - Q, Q = q1 + q2, and both firms have a constant marginal cost of 10
If firm 1 is a Stackelberg leader and firm 2's best response function is q2 = (100 – q1)/2, at the Nash-Stackelberg equilibrium firm 1's output is A) 30.
B) 40.
C) 60.
D) 70.
B
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If incomes grow during the next year, what will happen in the market for RVs? (Assume that RVs are normal goods.)
What will be an ideal response?
Suppose all automobile manufacturers have collusively agreed to sell their cars at a uniform price. If a firm wanted to break this agreement and not be detected, what would be one way to do this?
Refer to Table 9-6. What is the value of $B in stage 1?
A) $100 B) $200 C) $600 D) $800
Which describes an oligopoly?
a. one firm producing 95% of the output b. two to four firms producing 70% - 80% of the output c. eight to ten firms producing 60% - 70% of the output d. ten or more firms producing 90% of the output