Suppose that there are two types of cars, good and bad. The qualities of cars are not observable but are known to the sellers. Risk-neutral buyers and sellers have their own valuation of these two types of cars as follows: Types of CarsBuyer's ValuationSeller's ValuationGood (50% probability)5,0004,500Bad (50% probability)3,0002,500Now suppose that sellers value a good car at $4,500 and a bad car at $2,500, and quality is not observed by the buyers. What is the highest price that risk-neutral buyers will offer for a used car if they recognize adverse selection?
A. $4,000
B. $3,000
C. $4,500
D. $2,500
Answer: B
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